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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: KEEPING A
RESPECTFUL EYE ON CONGRESS
Louis Fisher*
EDERAL courts fashion various canons and guidelines for statu-
tory construction, relying on rules and conventions to interpret and
decide the meaning of a statute. This article takes an institutional
look at the record of federal courts in performing that function. How
well do they respect the prerogatives of other political centers, especially
Congress, and avoid unnecessary and potentially damaging collisions with
another governmental branch? Intelligent and prudent statutory con-
struction carries with it a sensitive peripheral vision to the rights and du-
ties of Congress and to the larger legal and political system. Part of
statutory interpretation is to "decide whether or not a particular decision
favoring one side of a dispute should be left to the legislature (or
agency)."' When deciding the meaning of a statute, courts should
"[riespect the position of the legislature as the chief policy-determining
agency of the society, subject only to the limitations of the constitution
under which it exercises its powers."' 2 But, at times judges seem so preoc-
cupied with the minutiae of the canons of statutory construction, or with
their desire to do good, that they lose sight of institutional interests.
Many of the canons of statutory construction-ranging from the "plain
meaning rule" to the "rule of lenity"-appear to have a static quality.
For example, courts "do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statu-
tory text that is clear." 3 Under the principle of lenity, any ambiguity in a
criminal statute must be resolved "in favor of the defendant."'4 Yet im-
plicit in these canons is (or should be) a judicial recognition that Congress
is the principal branch for making laws and deciding budget allocations.
The rule of lenity includes a due process component by giving "fair warn-
* Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Congressional Research Service, The
Library of Congress. Ph.D., New School for Social Research, 1967; B.S., College of Wil-
liam and Mary, 1956. The author appreciates valuable comments and advice from Lack-
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UTORY INTERPRETATION 230 (1999).
2. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
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SMU LAW REVIEW
ing" to citizens,5 but it also acknowledges that "legislatures and not courts
should define criminal activity."' 6 If Congress wishes to rewrite criminal
law to go beyond the boundaries set in the Court's decision, it is free to
do so. As Justice Blackmun noted in a dissent in a case involving criminal
law: "Now Congress must try again to fill a hole it rightly felt it had filled
before." 7
The first part of this Article begins with the doctrine of stare decisis,
which defers to Congress on the need to change statutory policy. Stare
decisis keeps courts aware of their obligations to institutions outside the
judiciary. Section II pursues the same theme by examining cases involv-
ing maritime law, attorneys' fees, and civil rights, illustrating how the
Supreme Court can rule narrowly to allow Congress to revisit an area and
legislate new rights. Section III, discussing repeals by implication, further
develops the position that changes in the law should be made expressly
by Congress, not inferred by the courts. The examples include the Snail
Darter Case, the Hyde Amendment, and veterans' benefits. Section IV
focuses on cases that mandate the spending of public funds and trench
upon a key prerogative of Congress. The final section reviews some
prominent disputes about the legitimacy of legislative history.
I. STARE DECISIS
In the interest of consistency and predictability, judges prefer to decide
cases in accordance with past rulings, but stare decisis is more than simply
holding fast to precedents. It is a reminder to courts to take account of
the larger interests of society and legislative prerogatives. Judges should
do more than write good decisions, they have a responsibility to fit their
duties within the limits of the political system.
Continuity is important for statutory law because it permits citizens to
arrange their affairs with greater confidence. Courts should not upset
that sense of security and stability by needlessly disrupting the law. With-
out settled legal principles, "[I]t would be impossible for a lawyer to give
any dependable advice to a client."8 "Judicial decisions affecting the
business interests of the country should not be disturbed except for the
most cogent reasons, certainly not because of subsequent doubts as to
their soundness."9 Without uniformity and continuity in the law, "the in-
tegrity of contracts, wills, conveyances and securities is impaired." 10
When it becomes necessary to change the law, "the legislature can make
it with infinitely less derangement of those interests than would follow a
new ruling of [a] court, for statutory regulations would operate only in
5. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-50 (1971) (quoting McBoyle v. United
States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)).
6. Id. at 348.
7. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 162 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
8. Fred W. Catlett, The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent
to Which It Should be Applied, 21 WASH. L. REV. 158, 159 (1946).
9. National Bank v. Whitney, 103 U.S. 99, 102 (1880).
10. William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 735-36 (1949).
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the future.""
Roscoe Pound explained one of the reasons why courts approach
change with caution: "The courts in the past have not been ready to over-
turn established precepts with every swing of political and economic
opinion, especially when they swing so much and so fast. These sudden
changes, making new rules operating for the future are for the legisla-
ture.' 2 Judicial caution is also necessary because the introduction of new
ideas in a judicial ruling rather than in a statute is likely to have unpre-
dictable ripple effects on legal doctrines and legal reasoning. Pound
pointed out that
statutes make rules only for the cases within their purview. Hence
when a new proposition comes in by legislation it does not disturb
the general legal system, no matter how radically it departs from
what went before. But when something radically new comes in by
judicial decision, no one can foretell what disturbing effects may re-
sult. It does not merely decide the exact state of facts which it served
to adjudicate, it is potentially a starting point for analogical reason-
ing for cases in widely distinct parts of the legal system. That a court
has overturned rule A at once puts rules B, C, and D, rules M, and
N, and rules P, and Q in question, because any rule at all analogous
to A is likely to be challenged on the analogy of rule X, which has
taken the place of A.13
The doctrine of stare decisis carries particular force for statutory con-
struction. The practice of the Supreme Court is "not to apply stare decisis
as rigidly in constitutional as in nonconstitutional [statutory] cases.' 14
The judiciary's "reluctance to overturn precedents regarding statutory
construction "derives in part from institutional concerns about the rela-
tionship of the Judiciary to Congress.' u5 If the Court errs on a statutory
matter, legislatures may pass a new statute. "Congress is free to change
[the] Court's interpretation of its legislation.' 1 6 With regard to statutory
questions, Justice Brandeis said that "in most matters it is more important
that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.' 17
At the federal level, the primary lawmaking power resides in Congress.
If the doctrine of separation of powers is to have meaning, "it means that
the task of creating law falls upon the legislature, and that courts must
obey and enforce the constitutionally legitimate enactments of the legisla-
tive branch.' 8 If there is doubt that statutory law or case law provides
11. Whitney, 103 U.S. at 102.
12. Roscoe Pound, What of Stare Decisis?, 10 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 10 (1941).
13. See id. at 10.
14. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543 (1962).
15. Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996).
16. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977).
17. Commissioner v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
18. Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The Case for an Absolute Rule of
Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REv. 177, 201 (1989).
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for a legal right, the proper avenue is to leave the matter to Congress and
let it be decided through the legislative process.
In a 1989 civil rights case, the Court spoke about the wisdom of letting
statutory construction remain undisturbed in order to respect the law-
making power of Congress: "Considerations of stare decisis have special
force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the con-
text of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated,
and Congress remains free to alter what we have done."'19 When courts
overrule statutory precedents, "the primary reason.., has been the inter-
vening development of the law, through either the growth of judicial doc-
trine or further action taken by Congress. 20
II. LETTING CONGRESS LEGISLATE
Federal courts frequently decline the invitation by private parties to
create statutory rights left unrecognized by Congress. Should judges
make new law to overcome "legislative inertia?"2' The creation of new
legal rights is Congress's job, and part of a legislator's task is the decision
whether to overcome legislative (and public) inertia and, perhaps, a Pres-
ident's veto. Those political judgments are best left to the political
branches.
One could argue that the difficulty of enacting new legislation and
overcoming these built-in hurdles calls for judicial initiatives, but the in-
stitutional hazards here for the courts loom large. When courts fail to
resist the temptation to make new law, they may find themselves back-
tracking to a more secure position. Deference to the legislative branch is
especially appropriate when additional funding is required. If the polit-
ical branches decide that judicial rulings are too restrained to satisfy con-
temporary needs, they can legislate new rights.
A. MARITIME LAw
The Constitution specifically grants to the Supreme Court only one
area of substantive law: "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdic-
tion."'2 2 For more than a century, maritime law was essentially judge-
made law. Congress enacted few statutes to guide the courts.2 3 A series
of cases from 1970 to 1990, however, illustrate how the Court went too far
in discovering and announcing new legal rights in maritime law. Eventu-
ally these legislative initiatives so divided the Court that it found it neces-
sary to pull back out of respect for the legislative powers of Congress. A
federal appellate judge bemoaned this gradual loss of maritime
jurisdiction:
19. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989).
20. Id. at 173.
21. POPKIN, supra note 1, at 234.
22. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2.
23. See 1 BENEDICr ON ADMIRALTY §§ 109-10 (7th ed. Rev. 1996).
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The Supreme Court-whose members are admiralty judges when
they hear admiralty appeals-has recently abandoned its Constitu-
tional duty of enunciating maritime law in favor of conforming admi-
ralty law to Congressional enactments and filling in gaps in maritime
law only when authorized by Congress. Apparently admiralty judges
should now assume the role of followers rather than leaders. Have
admiralty judges become flotsam on the sea of maritime law? 24
In 1970, the Supreme Court decided a case brought by a woman whose
husband had been killed while working aboard a vessel in the waters of
Florida.25 She sought damages for wrongful death and for the pain and
suffering he experienced prior to death, claiming both negligence and the
unseaworthiness of the vessel. Although "Congress had created actions
for wrongful deaths of railroad employees, of merchant seamen, and of
persons on the high seas,"26 no statute specifically permitted a cause of
action for the deceased's wife. Finding that "Congress has given no af-
firmative indication of an intent to preclude the judicial allowance of a
remedy for wrongful death to persons in the situation of [the] peti-
tioner,"27 a unanimous Court ruled that the wife was not foreclosed from
bringing the action under federal maritime law.28
Relying on legislative history rather than statutory text, the Court con-
cluded that "Congress intended to ensure the continued availability of a
remedy, historically provided by the States, for deaths in territorial wa-
ters .... -29 Although the Court was providing a right not specifically
authorized by statute, Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court revealed a
keen sensitivity to congressional prerogatives. He said it was a duty of
the Court to "analyze with care the congressional enactments that have
abrogated the common-law rule in the maritime field, to determine the
impact of the fact that none applies in terms to the situation of this
case."' 30 The Court looked to Congress for "direction in its legislation
granting remedies for wrongful deaths in portions of the maritime
domain." 31
To help explain its decision, the Court said it was seeking to redress
three "anomalies" in maritime law.32 First, liability existed "if the victim
is merely injured, but frequently not if he is killed. '33 Second, there was
liability beyond the three-mile limit "but not within the territorial waters
of a State whose local statute excludes unseaworthiness claims."' 34 Third,
24. The Hon. John R. Brown, Admiralty Judges: Flotsam on the Sea of Maritime Law?,
24 J. MAR. L. & COM. 249, 249 (1993). As a Senior Judge for the Fifth Circuit, Judge Brown
presented this address on November 5, 1992. He died on January 23, 1993.
25. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
26. Id. at 390 (citations omitted).
27. Id. at 393.
28. See id. at 409.
29. Id. at 397.
30. Id. at 392-93.
31. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 393.




the "strangest" anomaly was that a seaman covered by the Jones Act was
"provided no remedy for death caused by unseaworthiness within territo-
rial waters, [whereas a longshoreman did] have such a remedy when al-
lowed by a state statute. '35
Justice Harlan argued that it was unreasonable to presume that Con-
gress meant to prevent the Court from resolving discrepancies in mari-
time law, "ceding that function exclusively to the States. '36 In searching
the legislative history of the Death on the High Seas Act, Harlan could
find no such legislative intent.37 He was convinced that his decision was
"wholly consistent with the congressional purpose." 38 A law review arti-
cle praised Justice Harlan for "combin[ing] high judicial craftsmanship
with republican attention to the legislature's role in articulating public
values. "39
The Court took a different tack four years later. A longshoreman was
severely injured aboard a vessel in Louisiana waters. After recovering
damages for past and future wages, pain and suffering, and medical and
incidental expenses, he died and his wife brought a wrongful-death action
for damages she suffered. The Court ruled that she was entitled to re-
cover damages "for loss of support, services, and society, as well as fu-
neral expenses."'40 Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan looked not to
congressional policy for guidance, but solely to state practices and aca-
demic commentators. 41 He was also motivated by a desire to fulfill "the
humanitarian policy of the maritime law."'42 Harlan had bent over back-
wards to avoid friction with Congress; Brennan showed no such interest.
Justice Brennan's decision split the Court 5 to 4. The dissenting opin-
ion, written by Justice Powell and joined by Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tices Stewart and Rehnquist, described the majority's approach as "a
nearly total nullification of the congressional enactments previously gov-
erning maritime wrongful death .... Several limitations built into those
congressional enactments have been swept aside by the majority's deci-
sion."'43 Powell compared Harlan's decision-"essentially a response to a
gap in maritime remedies for deaths occurring in state territorial wa-
ters"-with the "sort of tabula rasa restucturing of the law of admiralty"
used by Brennan.44 Powell said that Brennan's opinion exhibited "little
35. Id. at 395-96.
36. Id. at 396-97.
37. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 397.
38. Id. at 400. For an appreciative analysis of Justice Harlan's decision, see Note, The
Legitimacy of Civil Law Reasoning in the Common Law: Justice Harlan's Contribution, 82
YALE L.J. 258 (1972). See also GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF
STATUTES 151-52 (1982); GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMI-
RALTY 367-69 (2d ed. 1975).
39. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Com-
mon Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REv. 875, 897 (1991).
40. Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 584 (1974).
41. See id. at 587, 591.
42. Id. at 588.
43. Id. at 595.
44. Id. at 596.
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deference ... for enunciated congressional policy."'45 "[T]he Court's
holding that loss of society may be recovered is a clear example of the
majority's repudiation of the congressional purposes expressed in the two
federal maritime wrongful-death statutes. '46
In 1978, in deciding a case involving a wrongful death on the high seas,
the Court was critical of Brennan's decision. 47 The question was whether
one's survivors may recover damages in addition to damages authorized
by Congress. The Fifth Circuit had held that survivors may recover for
their "loss of society. '48 The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the
majority, Justice Stevens noted that Brennan's decision in 1974 "differed
from the choice made by Congress when it enacted the Death on the
High Seas Act [DOHSA]. ''49 Acknowledging that there were valid argu-
ments on each side of the loss-of-society issue, Stevens said "we need not
pause to evaluate the opposing policy arguments. Congress has struck
the balance for us" by limiting survivors to recovery for pecuniary
losses. 50 He added that "Congress did not limit DOHSA beneficiaries to
the recovery of pecuniary losses in order to encourage the courts to cre-
ate nonpecuniary supplements."51 Stevens drew a line on judicial law-
making: "There is a basic difference between filling a gap left by
Congress' silence and rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and
specifically enacted. '52
Finally, in 1990, a unanimous Court decided to put a brake on its legis-
lative initiatives in maritime law.53 The case involved a mother's effort to
recover loss of society for the death of her son, a seaman, and compensa-
tion for his lost future income. The Court suggested that changes in the
legal climate required a more restrained judiciary:
We no longer live in an era when seamen and their loved ones must
look primarily to the courts as a source of substantive legal protec-
tion from injury and death; Congress and the States have legislated
extensively in these areas. In this era, an admiralty court should look
primarily to these legislative enactments for policy guidance. We
may supplement these statutory remedies where doing so would
achieve the uniform vindication of such policies consistent with our
constitutional mandate, but we must also keep strictly within the lim-
its imposed by Congress. Congress retains superior authority in
these matters, and an admiralty court must be vigilant not to over-
step the well-considered boundaries imposed by federal legislation.54
45. Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 596.
46. Id. at 605. For a general criticism of Justice Brennan's decision in Gaudet, see
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 37, at 369-74.
47. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
48. Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422, 435 (5th Cir. 1977).
49. Mobil Oil Corp., 436 U.S. at 622.
50. Id. at 623.
51. Id. at 625.
52. Id. Note that Brennan took no part in the consideration of this case and Marshall,
joined by Blackmun, dissented. See id. at 618.
53. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
54. Id. at 27.
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Because of recent congressional enactments, the Court pointed out
that had the widow in Moragne "brought her action today, it would be
foreclosed by statute. '55 In light of the maritime policy established by
Congress, the Court said it would be "inconsistent with our place in the
constitutional scheme were we to sanction more expansive remedies in a
judicially created cause of action in which liability is without fault than
Congress has allowed in cases of death resulting from negligence. '56 It
concluded that the mother could not recover loss of society for the death
of her son. 57 The Court also declined to grant her compensation for the
loss of her son's future income, remarking that maritime tort law "is now
dominated by federal statute .... Congress has placed limits on recovery
in survival actions that we cannot exceed."58
B. ATTORNEYS' FEES
Under the "American Rule," attorneys' fees are ordinarily not avail-
able to the prevailing litigant in a federal lawsuit unless Congress has
supplied statutory authorization.5 9 In limited instances, federal courts
may assess attorneys' fees without statutory authorization,60 but for the
most part the matter is left to congressional judgment.
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided that the Education of the Handi-
capped Act (EHA) did not authorize the payment of attorneys' fees to
parents who brought an action against the state of Rhode Island to have
their child placed in a special education program.61 The Court also de-
cided that "Congress intended the EHA to be the exclusive avenue
through which a plaintiff may assert an equal protection claim to a pub-
licly financed special education. ' 62 In so ruling, the Court denied that the
parents were entitled to attorneys' fees under other statutes, such as the
Rehabilitation Act. 63
A dissent by Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens,
objected that the Court effectively repealed rights and expectations avail-
able in the Rehabilitation Act and the legislative history of the EHA.64
However, the Court had "repealed" nothing. It simply decided that the
EHA was the exclusive remedy for the plaintiffs and that the EHA failed
to expressly provide for attorneys' fees. The dissenters remarked that
"Congress will now have to take the time to revisit the matter. '65 Im-
plicit in that comment is that it would have been better for the Court to
55. Id. at 28.
56. Id. at 32-33.
57. See id. at 33.
58. Miles, 498 U.S. at 36.
59. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
60. See Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991); Roadway Express, Inc. v.
Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765-67 (1980); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973).
61. See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
62. Id. at 1009.
63. See id. at 1021.
64. See id. at 1025-26.
65. Id. at 1031.
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settle the matter and save Congress the bother. But it was appropriate
for Congress to take the time to legislate because it was peculiarly the
province of Congress to decide the issue and establish national policy.
During floor debate on legislation to reverse the Court's decision, Sen-
ator Paul Simon objected that the Court had "misinterpreted congres-
sional intent."'66 In reporting the bill, the Senate Committee on Labor
and Human Resources said it was Congress's "original intent" to provide
attorneys' fees to parents under the EHA.67 Even if there was abundant
evidence that legislators in both chambers had intended attorneys' fees to
be available under the EHA, the Court would have been on solid ground
to say: "It might have been the intent of legislators to provide attorneys'
fees here, but that right is not in the statute and we are not going to put it
there. If Members of Congress believe that such a right is desirable, we
invite them to legislate it." At another point in the debate, Congressman
Pat Williams said that one of the objectives of the legislation to reverse
the Court was "to reestablish statutory rights repealed by the U.S.
Supreme Court in the decision in Smith versus Robinson. ' 68 The Court
could not repeal rights that were never there. In 1986, Congress
amended the EHA by expressly providing for attorneys' fees.69 The
Court did the right thing in sending the ball back to Congress.
C. CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
During the late 1980s, the Supreme Court came under heavy fire for
placing too narrow a construction on statutory protections for civil rights.
To critics, "these decisions signaled the most significant retreat in modern
times in the judicial construction of anti-discrimination laws."'70 But
these decisions can be defended on the ground that if new legal rights are
to be created, that job belongs to Congress, not the courts. As the Court
noted in 1981, federal courts "will not engraft a remedy on a statute, no
matter how salutary, that Congress did not intend to provide."
71
A civil rights decision by the Supreme Court in 1989 shifted the burden
to employees to prove that racial disparities in the work force resulted
from employment practices and were not justified by business needs. 72
This new test seemed to conflict with an earlier holding that required an
employee to demonstrate only disparate results, not intent.73 However,
66. 131 CONG. REc. 21,392 (1985).
67. S. REP. No. 99-112, at 2 (1985).
68. 131 CONG. REc. at 31370 (1985).
69. Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1994).
70. Steven R. Greenberger, Civil Rights and the Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 62
U. COLO. L. REv. 37, 37 n.11 (1991), citing ABA Resolution and Report on Civil Rights
Legislation Adopted by House of Delegates, Feb. 12, 1990 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 31,
at E-1 (Feb. 14, 1991). See also Barbara Luck Graham, Supreme Court Policymaking in
Civil Rights Cases: A Study of Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 7 ST. Louis U.
PuB. L. REv. 401 (1988).
71. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 297 (1981).
72. See Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
73. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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the Court in 1989 expressed concern that a more expansive doctrine on
disparate impact on minorities "would almost inexorably lead to the use
of numerical quotas in the workplace, a result that Congress and this
Court have rejected repeatedly in the past."'74
In a dissent, Justice Stevens ripped the Court for engaging in "judicial
activism."' 75 Authors of law review articles repeated that charge.76 But in
chastising the Court for judicial activism, these critics at the same time
rebuked the "conservative majority" of the Court for being "behind the
times" and "as outmoded as that of the Court when it handed down its
separate-but-equal decision in Plessy v. Ferguson almost one hundred
years ago."'77 Actually, what had taken place is better described as judi-
cial caution or judicial restraint. It would have been easier to charge the
Court with judicial activism had it taken a broader view of employee
rights. Justice Stevens correctly noted that "Congress frequently revisits
this [civil rights] statutory scheme and can readily correct our mistakes if
we misread its meaning. ' 78 Two years later Congress did precisely that.
Also controversial was a 1989 decision that limited the reach of a civil
rights statute (§ 1981), passed in 1866, that gave blacks the same right to
"make and enforce contracts" as whites. 79 Brenda Patterson, a black wo-
man, claimed that her employer had harassed her, withheld promotion,
and discharged her for reasons of race. The Court decided that Section
1981 was limited to prohibiting discriminatory actions before someone is
hired, not after, and advised Patterson that she should have brought her
suit under Title VII.80 The Court said it was reluctant to read the 1866
statute "broadly where the result is to circumvent the detailed remedial
scheme constructed in a later statute" (Title VII).81 The Court also iden-
tified issues of federalism, stating that to read § 1981 expansively "would
federalize all state-law claims for breach of contract where racial animus
is alleged .... "82 Although the Court would be compelled to follow such
a reading "when Congress plainly directs," it was "reluctant to federalize
matters" traditionally covered by state common law."'83
In deciding the case, the Court had to confront an earlier decision that
held that § 1981 prohibits discrimination not only by state governments,
but also by private parties. 84 Following the principle of stare decisis, the
Court adhered to the previous interpretation but distinguished it from the
74. Atonio, 490 U.S. at 653.
75. Id. at 663.
76. See Jesse A. Witten, Disparate Impact Doctrine Revisited: Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989), 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 383, 384 (1989); Robert
Belton, Causation and Burden-Shifting Doctrines in Employment Discrimination Law Re-
visited: Some Thoughts on Hopkins and Wards Cove, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1359, 1403 (1990).
77. Belton, supra note 75, at 1405.
78. Atonio, 490 U.S. at 672.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
80. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 180-81 (1989).
81. Id. at 181.
82. Id. at 183.
83. Id. (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977)).
84. See id. at 171; see also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
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circumstances in the Brenda Patterson case.85 Tiptoeing through a haz-
ardous area, the Court managed to keep faith with precedent while de-
clining to resolve a matter that deserved congressional action.86
Institutionally, the Court showed good judgment in deciding these cases
narrowly and tossing the ball back to Congress.
In his dissent in the Brenda Patterson case, Justice Brennan objected
that the Court had given § 1981 "a needlessly cramped interpretation"
and "select[ed] the most pinched reading of the phrase 'same right to
make a contract.'" '87 Commentary in law reviews was equally biting.88
Had the Court looked merely vertically at its own rulings, it might have
ruled in favor of Brenda Patterson. Instead, it looked horizontally, or
sideways, at its circumscribed place in the political system.
D. THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
For two decades, the Court had been boxed around the ears for engag-
ing in judicial activism and deciding what was best for the country. Re-
cent nominees to the Court passed through the fire of Senate
confirmation and were made doubly conscious of the temper of the coun-
try. Candidates for the federal courts were inclined to eschew activism in
statutory as well as Constitutional interpretation.
At his confirmation hearing in 1987 to become Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court, Judge Anthony M. Kennedy was asked about his Ninth
Circuit decision finding that the State of Washington had not violated
civil rights law by paying women substantially less than men for compara-
ble work. He replied that Congress had enacted an equal pay act but not
a statute on comparable pay,89 and that "if the Congress wants to enact
that, I will enforce it. If the Congress has not enacted it, I cannot as a
judge invent it."90 Later he said that he was "quite willing to posit that
the framers did not give courts authority to create a just society." 91
Asked who determines the attributes of a just society, he replied that "it
is the prerogative and the responsibility of the political branch to take the
85. See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 171-72.
86. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation, Legislative Inaction, and Civil
Rights, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2 (1988).
87. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 189 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. See Kelly J. Andrews, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union: The Deconstruction of a
Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Statute, 35 How. L.J. 403 (1992); Christopher Mellevold,
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union: Denying the Equality of Effect in the Right to Contract,
11 PACE L. REV. 411 (1991); Allan H. Macurdy, Classical Nostalgia: Racism, Contract
Ideology, and Formalist Legal Reasoning in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 18 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 987 (1990-1991); Cynthia Gail Smith, Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union: New Limitations on an Old Civil Rights Statute, 68 N.C. L. REv. 799 (1990); Wil-
liam B. Gould, IV, The Supreme Court and Employment Discrimination Law in 1989: Judi-
cial Retreat and Congressional Response, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1485, 1503-11 (1990).
89. Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 159
(1989).
90. Id. at 161.
91. Id. at 166.
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leadership there. '92 Kennedy then elaborated on the role of courts in a
democratic society:
There is the deference that the Court owes to the democratic pro-
cess, the deference that the Court owes to the legislative process, the
respect that must be given to the role of the legislature, which itself is
an interpreter of the Constitution, and the respect that must be given
to the legislature because it knows the values of the people. 93
Liberals criticized other decisions during this period taking an overly
restrictive view of civil rights legislation. 94 After two years of debate,
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to reverse or modify nine
Court rulings that dealt with employment discrimination. 95 In response
to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,96 Congress returned to the em-
ployer the burden of proving that a discriminatory practice is a business
necessity.97 Based on the decision in the Brenda Patterson case, Con-
gress prohibited discrimination on the job.98 Congress also altered other
judicial decisions on civil rights.99 Some have seen the 1991 statute as a
reproach to the Court, but it represented the proper division between the
judicial and legislative branches of the roles of faithful agent and origina-
tor of new instructions. The Court's caution in extending civil rights to
new areas was remedied as it should be: by congressional action.
III. REPEALS BY IMPLICATION
A doctrine that valuably distinguishes the judicial and legislative roles
is the principle that federal courts do not assume that Congress uses one
statute to implicitly repeal an earlier one. Congress, as the lawmaking
body, must decide for itself when to use express language to repeal a law.
92. Id. at 178.
93. Id. at 180.
94. Among the cases criticized: Independent Fed. of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491
U.S. 754 (1989); Lorance v. AT&T Tech., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755 (1989). See Eric Schapper, Statutory Misinterpretation: A Legal Autopsy, 68 No-
TRE DAME L. REV. 1095 (1993).
95. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
96. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
97. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105.
98. See id. § 101.
99. In response to Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), Congress provided notice to
interested nonparties and gave them an opportunity to be heard when a consent decree is
proposed. See 105 Stat. 1076, § 108. With regard to Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.,
490 U.S. 900 (1989), Congress allowed challenges to a discriminatory action when a person
is actually harmed. See 105 Stat. 1078, § 112. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 also modified
other decisions, such as Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). The Civil
Rights Act of 1991 provides that once a plaintiff proves that "race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor" in an employer's decision, the employer is liable
for a Title VII violation. 105 Stat. 1075, § 107. Winning parties could recover the costs of
hiring experts who assisted them, 105 Stat. 1079, § 113, thus modifying Crawford Fitting
Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987) and West Virginia Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499
U.S. 83 (1991). Winning parties in bias cases could have up to 90 days to recover payment,
105 Stat. 1079, § 114, reversing Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1987). Title VII
was extended to U.S. workers abroad, 105 Stat. 1077, § 109, reversing EEOC v. Arabian
Am. Oil. Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
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The doctrine disfavoring repeals by implication "applies with full vigor
when... the subsequent legislation is an appropriations measure .... -"oo
The courts take note of House and Senate rules that generally prohibit
adding legislation to appropriations bills.1°1 Repeal in an appropriations
statute in particular, is an acceptable conclusion only if Congress ex-
pressly relates the appropriations proviso to a previous law.' 02 The ap-
propriations language must leave no doubt about legislative intent, like
stating that no funds may be available to implement a previously author-
ized purpose, "notwithstanding" stated portions of the law identified in
the appropriations bill. 0 3
When statutes conflict, the courts should (and do) make an effort to
protect both legislative objectives. "Where there are two acts upon the
same subject, effect should be given to both if possible."''1 4 "The courts
are not at liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments,
and when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the
courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary,
to regard each as effective."'01 5 "[T]he intention of the legislature to re-
peal must be clear and manifest."' 6 Unless the two statutes are in irrec-
oncilable conflict, courts "must read the statutes to give effect to each if
we can do so while preserving their sense and purpose."' 0 7
A. THE SNAIL DARTER CASE
In 1978, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a congressional
decision to continue appropriating funds for the Tellico Dam in Tennes-
see constituted an implied repeal of the Endangered Species Act of 1973,
at least as the statute applied to the dam. 10 8 Environmentalists claimed
that the dam threatened the survival of a three-inch fish called the snail
darter.'0 9 Although statements from various reports by the House and
Senate Appropriations Committees were offered in support of the posi-
tion that the funding statutes took precedence over the authorizing legis-
lation, the Court was "unwilling to assume that these latter Committee
statements constituted advice to ignore the provisions of a duly enacted
law . . . ."110 The Court stated:
100. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 785 (D.C.
Cir. 1971). See also United States v. Langston, 118 U.S. 389, 393 (1886).
101. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 353-54 (8th Cir.
1972).
102. See United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554 (1940).
103. See id. at 555.
104. Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936).
105. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).
106. Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U.S. 596, 602 (1883).
107. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981). See also Argentine Republic v. Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 438 (1989); United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453
(1988); Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 524 (1987).
108. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
109. See id. at 158-62.
110. Id. at 189.
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The doctrine disfavoring repeals by implication.., applies with even
greater force when the claimed repeal rests solely on an Appropria-
tions Act. We recognize that both substantive enactments and ap-
propriations measures are "Acts of Congress," but the latter have
the limited and specific purpose of providing funds for authorized
programs. When voting on appropriations measures, legislators are
entitled to operate under the assumption that the funds will be de-
voted to purposes which are lawful and not for any purpose forbid-
den. Without such an assurance, every appropriations measure
would be pregnant with prospects of altering substantive legislation,
repealing by implication any prior statute which might prohibit the
expenditure. Not only would this lead to the absurd result of requir-
ing Members to review exhaustively the background of every author-
ization before voting on an appropriation, but it would flout the very
rules the Congress carefully adopted to avoid this need.'1 '
The Court further stated that "the commitment to the separation of
powers is too fundamental for us to pre-empt congressional action by ju-
dicially decreeing what accords with 'common sense and the public weal.'
Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches." 112
Recalling language from Marbury v. Madison that "[i]t is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,"
the Court remarked that "it is equally-and emphatically-the exclusive
province of the Congress not only to formulate legislative policies and
mandate programs and projects, but also to establish their relative prior-
ity for the Nation. ' 113
B. THE HYDE AMENDMENT
The Court's language of fidelity to separation of powers, sweeping in
nature and unconditional in tone, has not prevented appellate courts
from reaching uneven results in similar cases. Federal courts differed on
the question whether the Hyde Amendment, by limiting federal funds for
abortions by indigent women, effected a substantive change to Title XIX
of the Social Security Act, which governs the Medicaid Program. In 1979,
the First Circuit held that Congress utilized the device of withholding fed-
eral funds as the means of making a substantive change in the law:
[T]he record is clear that both houses of Congress were acutely con-
scious that they were engaging in substantive legislation. The very
first event which took place in the House of Representatives was the
making of two points of order, the sustaining of the same, and an
amendment by sponsor Hyde simply confining his Amendment to a
ban on spending federal funds for abortions, any abortions. 114
Two points of order were sustained on versions of the Hyde provision
as adding "legislation" to an appropriations bill. The court held that the
111. Id. at 190-91 (emphasis in original).
112. Id. at 195.
113. Id. at 194 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803)).
114. Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 129 (1st Cir. 1979).
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third and successful amendment constituted substantive legislation:
"[W]e are persuaded that Congress realized that it was using the unusual
and frowned upon device of legislating via an appropriations measure to
accomplish a substantive result.""n5
In contrast, a federal district court interpreted the Hyde Amendment
by giving greater weight to the "recognized and settled policy of Congress
against legislating in the appropriations context .... ,1116 The court found
that "the proponents of the [Hyde] amendment expressed their regret
that their efforts to change substantive law on abortions languished in
committee.. .. ,,17 On the basis of this reading, the court held that the
Hyde Amendment merely restricted the use of federal funds for abor-
tions and did not represent "a clear, substantive limitation on Title
XIX."118
In the case that eventually reached the Supreme Court, a New York
district court ruled that the Hyde Amendment had changed the substan-
tive requirements of Title XIX.119 To the district court, the legislative
history of the Hyde Amendment demonstrated that it was intended to be
"legislation" on an appropriations bill.' 20 However, the Supreme Court
found it unnecessary to decide whether the Hyde Amendment changed
Title XIX.121
C. VETERANS' BENEFITS
A 1988 Supreme Court decision illustrates proper judicial deference to
the legislative branch. A dispute arose over a decision by the Veterans'
Administration (VA) to deny two honorably discharged veterans an ex-
tension of time to use their veterans' educational benefits. Under the law
enacted in 1977, veterans could obtain an extension if they had been ear-
lier prevented from using their benefits by "a physical or mental disability
which was not the result of [their] own willful misconduct. 1 22 The
agency had long construed the term "willful misconduct" to include pri-
mary alcoholism, and the Court assumed that Congress was aware of the
VA interpretation.123 A Senate report on the 1977 legislation specifically
referred to the VA's manual relating primary alcoholism to willful
misconduct. 124
In 1978, Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act but did not "evince
115. Id. at 131.
116. Doe v. Busbee, 471 F.Supp. 1326, 1333 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See McRae v. Califano, 491 F.Supp. 630 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 448 U.S. 297
(1980).
120. See id. at 689.
121. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 310 n.14 (1980).
122. Rehabilitation Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 1439, § 203 (1977).
123. See Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 545-46 (1988) (describing primary alcoholism
as "alcoholism that is not 'secondary to a manifestation of an acquired psychiatric
disorder"').
124. See id. at 546 (citing S. REP. No. 95-468, at 69-70 (1977)).
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any intent to repeal or amend" the willful-misconduct provision.125 The
Court refused to accept the argument that in 1978 Congress had implicitly
repealed the provision of the previous year, and cited a number of cases
for the principle that repeals by implication are disfavored.' 26 The Court
knew that authorities were "sharply divided" over the question of
whether alcoholism is a disease rather than misconduct, but for those who
regarded the Court's decision as erroneous, the Court advised that "their
arguments are better presented to Congress than to the courts.' 27 Con-
gress enacted legislation to provide that chronic alcoholism could not be
used as a basis under the willful-misconduct standard for denying veter-
ans the right to seek education or rehabilitation.' 28 The sequence worked
well here. The Court offered a narrow interpretation and invited Con-
gress to enact new policy.
IV. ALLOCATING PUBLIC FUNDS
In Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton concluded that the judiciary,
of the three branches, "will always be the least dangerous to the political
rights of the Constitution" because it has "no influence over either the
sword or the purse."' 29 He should be around today. To implement Con-
stitutional rights, courts often decide cases that mandate public funding.
As a means of desegregating public schools, federal judges ordered the
busing of students from inner cities to outlying suburbs.' 30 Opposition to
those decisions, from both white and black parents, helped convince the
courts to limit busing.' 31 Continued public and congressional opposition
further diminished court-ordered busing.
In 1990, the Court issued an extraordinary decision that endorsed the
power of federal judges to order local governmental bodies to increase
taxes to pay for a $1.8 billion court-ordered school desegregation plan.13 2
In a concurrence, Justice Kennedy objected that the decision's "casual
embrace of taxation imposed by the unelected, life-tenured Federal Judi-
ciary disregards fundamental precepts for the democratic control of pub-
lic institutions.' 1 33 Five years later, after strong protests from members
of Congress, the Court reversed itself, holding that a federal judge ex-
ceeded his authority by ordering pay increases for school personnel and
requiring increased funding for remedial programs in inner-city public
125. Id. at 547.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 552.
128. See Rehabilitation Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 4170, § 109 (1988).
129. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed. 1961).
130. See, e.g.,, North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
131. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U.S. 717 (1974).
132. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
133. Id. at 58-59.
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schools. 34 In other decisions, federal judges ordered public spending for
prisons and mental institutions. 135
Whatever justification there might be for courts to mandate spending
to enforce Constitutional rights, there is much less warrant for statutory
interpretations that require additional public expenditures. The alloca-
tion of funds from one priority to another is quintessentially a legislative
matter. "Prime responsibility for public finance rests with the legislature,
on the side both of revenue and expenditure.' 1 36 Court decisions that
encroach upon the "power of the purse" demonstrate a disregard for the
prerogatives of Congress and invite legislative action to keep the courts
within their bounds.
A. DECIDING WITNESS FEES
Some civil rights cases decided in the late 1980's concerned the pay-
ment of fees to witnesses in federal trials. In 1987, the Court held that
federal courts could not require a losing party to pay the winner's expert
witness fees beyond the limits specified by Congress. 137 Without explicit
statutory or contractual authorization "for the taxation of the expenses of
a litigant's witness as costs, federal courts are bound by the limitations"
set forth in congressional statutes. 38 In 1991, the Court held strictly to
statutory policy on the award of fees for services rendered by experts. 139
Congress subsequently passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which ex-
panded judicial authority to award the winning party the costs of hiring
experts. 40
In a 1991 decision that demonstrated little respect for Congress's
spending prerogative, a unanimous Supreme Court interpreted a congres-
sional statute to require payment of witness fees to a state prisoner who
was summoned to appear as a witness in a federal criminal trial."41 A
U.S. Attorney denied a prisoner's request for witness fees on the grounds
that the statute did not entitle prisoners to receive witness fees."42 A dis-
trict court and the Tenth Circuit properly agreed that the statute did not
authorize such payments."43 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that had Con-
gress wanted to reach that result, "it surely could have done so in more
express terms."' 44 The appellate court also noted that beyond the loss of
a very modest compensation that prisoners might receive from a prison
134. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
135. See Louis FISHER, AMERICAN CONSITUTIONAL LAW 21, 1008-12 (3d ed. 1999).
136. HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 698.
137. See Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987).
138. Id. at 445.
139. See West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
140. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1079, § 113 (1991).
141. See Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184 (1991).
142. See id. at 186.
143. See Demarest v. Manspeaker, 884 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 498 U.S. 184
(1991).
144. Id. at 1345.
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job, they generally incur no costs while serving as witnesses.145 Since the
payment of $30 a day for appearing as a witness was "much more" than
they would make at their prison jobs, there could be temptation for pris-
oners to file suits and subpoena friends among inmates to appear as
witnesses. 146
The Supreme Court seemed oblivious to these realities. Concentrating
on the statutory text, the Court observed that the only specific exception
was a denial of witness fees to paroled or deportable aliens.147 Moreover,
the statute provided that a subsistence allowance would be paid to a wit-
ness other than a witness who is incarcerated. 148 This latter provision
convinced the Court that Congress thought about incarcerated individu-
als when drafting the statute, and that the only class specifically excluded
were paroled or deportable aliens. 149 The Court said it was unable to
conclude that the payment of witness fees to prisoners was so bizarre that
it could not have been the intent of Congress. 150
The Court relied, at least implicitly, on the doctrine expressio unius est
exclusio alterius: if a statute specifies one exception to a general rule, it
excludes other exceptions.' 51 That doctrine, as Judge Richard Posner has
noted, assumes "legislative omniscience, because it would make sense
only if all omissions in legislative drafting were deliberate.' 1 52 It reminds
one of Justice Holmes's admonition when he was sitting on the First Cir-
cuit: "it is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to say: We see
what you are driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we shall
go on as before. '1 53
Within a year, Congress passed legislation to reverse the Court on wit-
ness fees, stating that any incarcerated prisoner required to appear as a
witness "may not receive fees or allowances.' 1 54 When the House Judici-
ary Committee reported the bill, it said that "Congress never intended
that prisoners in such a situation be compensated.' 1 55 During floor ac-
tion, Congressman Jack Brooks criticized the Court's opinion and drew
attention to the realities that had impressed the Tenth Circuit:
Congress provided witness fees-now at $40 per day-to defray the
costs incurred by persons when the paramount needs of the judicial
system take precedence over their work and other activities. This
rationale obviously has no application to prisoners, whose food, shel-
ter, and activities are already paid for by the taxpayer .... They are
undeserving of any additional benefit. I am certain that most prison-
145. See id. at 1346.
146. See id.
147. See Demarest, 498 U.S. at 187.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 188.
150. See id. at 191.
151. See BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990).
152. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Court-
room, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 813 (1983).
153. Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908).
154. Incarcerated Witness Fees Act of 1991, 106 Stat. 2138, § 2(a) (1992).
155. H.R. REp. No. 102-194, at 2 (1991).
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ers find promoting justice in the courtroom preferable to another
day behind bars. 156
Brooks pointed out that it was longstanding government policy to deny
witness fees to incarcerated persons, and that the Court's opinion "could
result in $8.3 million of taxpayer funds being transferred to prisoners
each year in the form of witness fees .... an outrageous misuse of public
funds."'1 57 Before enacting this legislation to permanently reverse the
Court, Congress responded to the decision by twice placing language in
appropriations bills to deny witness fees to incarcerated persons. A sup-
plemental appropriations bill provided that no funds appropriated to the
Justice Department for fiscal year 1991 or any prior fiscal year "shall be
obligated or expended to pay a fact witness fee to a person who is incar-
cerated testifying as a fact witness in a court of the United States."'1 58
Similar language was placed in the regular appropriations bill for the De-
partments of Commerce, Justice, and State.159
The unanimity of the Court's 1991 opinion is disappointing. Were the
Justices so determined to follow the fine technicalities of canons of con-
struction that they did not recognize the interests and rights of another
branch? Was there not a single Justice sensitive to the likely encroach-
ment on legislative prerogatives? It should not have been so difficult for
Justices to write: "Nothing in this statute expressly authorizes witness fees
to prisoners, and to do so would go against longstanding government pol-
icy. If prisoners are to be paid witness fees, then Congress must pass the
necessary legislation. Out of respect for the legislative branch, we decline
to read such intent into this statute." If the Court wants to cultivate re-
spect for an independent judiciary, then it must extend the same respect
to the other branches.
B. THE WINSTAR LITIGATION
In 1996, the Court held that a congressional statute nullified agree-
ments between savings and loan investors and the government, amount-
ing to a breach of contract. 160 The court largely confined the decision to
technical analyses of the "unmistakability doctrine," the elements that
constitute a "public and general act," and distinctions between the gov-
ernment acting as contractor and as sovereign. There seemed to be little
appreciation of the relationship to its sister branch, Congress. As a result
of this decision, the federal government now faces billions of dollars in
claims not only from S&Ls but from utilities, nuclear plants, and other
economic activities.
In response to the savings and loan crisis of the 1980's, the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board (Bank Board) encouraged healthy thrifts and
156. 137 CONG. REC. 32503 (1991).
157. Id. at 32503-04.
158. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 136 (1991).
159. See 105 Stat. 795, § 110 (1991).
160. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 838 (1996).
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outside investors to take over ailing institutions that had liabilities far in
excess of assets. As a means of helping the acquiring institutions meet
capital reserve requirements imposed by federal regulations, the Bank
Board permitted them to designate the excess of purchase price over the
fair market value of assets as an intangible asset called "good will. ' '161
Congress later passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) to gradually phase out the authority
of thrifts to count supervisory good will in calculating core capital. 162
1. Lower Court Rulings
Federal regulators seized some of the acquiring institutions because,
without the goodwill accounting technique, they failed to meet capital
requirements. In a leading case, the Winstar Corporation, the Statesman
Group, and Glendale Federal sued the United States in the Court of Fed-
eral Claims, which held that the federal government had breached the
contractual obligations that permitted thrifts to count goodwill. 163 A di-
vided panel for the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that FIRREA fell
within the sovereign acts doctrine, which absolved the government from
liability, and that the acquiring institutions had assumed the risk that the
law would change.164 The full court vacated that decision and agreed to
hear the case en banc, at which point it affirmed the Court of Federal
Claims. 165
Of special interest is the en banc court's reasoning on sovereign power.
The thrifts did not ask the Court of Federal Claims to provide injunctive
relief to enjoin the thrift regulators from applying FIRREA requirements
to the thrifts. Instead, they sought money damages for the government's
breach of contract. The appellate court claimed that money damages, "in
contrast to injunctive relief, presents little threat to the government's sov-
ereign powers, other than the obvious financial incentive to honor its con-
tracts."'1 66 Thus, Congress was "always free to deem supervisory goodwill
a bad idea and legislate it out of existence. Where that legislation
breached the government's prior contractual obligations regarding the
treatment of supervisory goodwill, however, the government remains lia-
ble in money damages for the breach."'1 67 In other words, Congress may
legislate as it likes, but the courts may interpret its actions to require bil-
lions of dollars in future appropriations, and such requirements are
deemed consistent with sovereign power. Would that ruling be any less
161. See id. at 848-49.
162. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 103
Stat. 304, § 1464(t)(3)(A) and 310, § 1464(t)(9)(B) (1989).
163. See Winstar Corp. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 112 (1990); 25 Cl. Ct. 541 (1992).
164. See Winstar Corp. v. United States, 994 F.2d 797 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
165. See Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). For
analysis of this decision, see Stanley I. Langbein, The Thrift Crisis and the Constitution, 53
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 159 (1996).
166. Winstar Corp., 64 F.3d at 1547-48.
167. Id. at 1548.
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invasive of sovereign power and legislative prerogatives than injunctive
relief?
The Federal Circuit denied the government's claim that FIRREA was a
public and general sovereign act that excused its contractual perform-
ance. The court concluded that the relevant sections of FIRREA "are
not public and general sovereign acts" and that therefore the sovereign
acts doctrine does not apply.168 To support that judgment the court relied
on circular reasoning: "While presumably all government action is en-
acted for the good of the public, government action whose principal effect
is to abrogate specific contractual rights does not immunize the govern-
ment from contractual liability under the doctrine."'1 69 To reach that
judgment, the appellate court had to make the implausible conclusion
that the 370-page statute, marking a comprehensive effort to deal with
the entire S&L crisis, has as its "principal effect" the abrogation of con-
tractual rights.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the claims court that in the case of
FIRREA "the government acts not in its capacity as sovereign, but in its
capacity as contractor.' 170 According to case law, when the government
enters into contracts, its rights and duties "are governed generally by the
law applicable to contracts between private individuals.' 17' When the
government steps into the commercial marketplace, it "contracts as does
a private person, under the broad dictates of the common law."'1 72 How-
ever, as Judge Lourie noted in a dissent, there was no reason to regard
Congress's action in FIRREA as contractual rather than sovereign: "The
government was not buying goods or services when it acted .... [FIR-
REA] was broadly directed to the good of the general public, to the
country's financial system, rather than to a specific contract that it disap-
proved."'1 73 In another dissent, Judge Nies noted that nothing in the con-
tracts between the acquiring institutions and the Bank Board promised
payment if Congress changed the accounting procedure for goodwill, and
the contracts did not free the thrifts "from the risk of a change in
regulations.' 74
The Federal Circuit dipped into legislative history to bolster its judg-
ment that members of Congress were aware that they were repudiating
the goodwill promises.' 75 In his dissent, Judge Lourie remarked:
That some members of Congress argued that enactment of certain
provisions of FIRREA would break promises made to the thrifts
does not mean that Congress's passage of FIRREA was not a sover-
168. d. at 1548.
169. Id. at 1549.
170. Id.
171. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934).
172. Torncello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756, 762 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (en banc.). See Freder-
ick W. Claybrook, Jr., Good Faith in the Termination and Formation of Federal Contracts,
56 MD. L. REv. 555 (1997).
173. Winstar Corp., 64 F.3d at 1553.
174. Id. at 1551.
175. See id. at 1550.
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eign act; .. .[n]or do such statements overcome the government's
sovereign right to enact comprehensive national legislation for the
common good without liability for breach of particularly affected
contracts. Thus, while the thrifts certainly were victimized when they
made commitments in reliance on accounting treatment agreed to by
the regulatory agencies, I am unable to conclude that the govern-
ment was powerless to enact appropriate legislation in order to
restructure the U.S. thrift industry. 176
2. The Supreme Court's Decision
Splintered in many directions, the Supreme Court affirmed the judg-
ment of the en banc Federal Circuit ruling. Justice Souter delivered a
plurality opinion joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer; Justice O'Connor
joined that opinion except for two parts. Justice Breyer wrote a separate
concurring opinion. Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and
Thomas, wrote another opinion, concurring in the judgment but offering
different legal reasoning. Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, joined in
part by Justice Ginsburg.
Justice Souter relied on a strained reading of the "unmistakability doc-
trine" to reject the government's claim of sovereign power. "[S]overeign
power... governs all contracts subject to the sovereign's jurisdiction, and
will remain intact unless surrendered in unmistakable terms. '177 Yet
Souter was unable to identify the unmistakable terms. Instead, he merely
stated that the government's position represents "a conceptual expansion
of the unmistakability doctrine beyond its historical and practical war-
rant" and places the doctrine "at odds with the Government's own long-
run interest as a reliable contracting partner .... ",178 One study con-
cluded that Souter's analysis "drastically restricts the application of the
unmistakability doctrine."'1 79
Justice Souter also rejected the claim that the sovereign acts doctrine is
available whenever the government performs "public and general
act[s]."'180 Allowing the government to avoid contractual liability
"merely by passing any 'regulatory statute' would flout the general princi-
ple" that whenever the government enters into a contract its rights and
duties are generally the same as when private individuals enter into con-
tracts.181 The sovereign acts doctrine, said Souter, "was meant to serve
this principle, not undermine it. ' ' 18 2 As Rehnquist noted in his dissent,
176. Id. at 1553.
177. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. at 872 (citing Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social
Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 52 (1986)) (quoting from Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982) (alterations in original).
178. Id. at 883.
179. Joshua I. Schwartz, Assembling Winstar: Triumph of the Ideal of Congruence in
Government Contract Law?, 26 PuB. CoNT. L.J. 481, 501 (1997).
180. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. at 891.
181. Id. at 895.
182. Id. For a close analysis of Justice Souter's position in narrowing the sovereign acts
doctrine, including the "public and general" requirement, see Schwartz, supra note 179, at
515-33.
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Souter's analysis eliminates the traditional distinction between the gov-
ernment as sovereign and the government as contractor, making the gov-
ernment liable in the same sense as a private party.183
Another issue was whether the Bank Board and the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) lacked authority "to bargain
away Congress's power to change the law in the future."'1 84 Souter con-
cluded that the agencies had "ample statutory authority" to promise
thrifts that they could count supervisory goodwill toward regulatory capi-
tal, and that they would be entitled to damages if that performance be-
came impossible.185 Indeed, in 1987, Congress specifically recognized
FSLIC's authority to allow thrifts to treat goodwill in that manner. 86
Breyer, concurring in the majority opinion by Souter, concluded that
the thrifts had made a convincing showing that the government specifi-
cally promised to extend to them a particular treatment for a period of
years, and that the abrogation of those promises by FIRREA "rendered
the Government liable for breach of contract."'1 87
Scalia's concurrence, joined by Kennedy and Thomas, agreed with the
basic premise that FIRREA constituted a breach of contract, but offered
different reasons for reaching that conclusion. Like the two dissenters,
Scalia believed that the unmistakability doctrine applied to FIRREA,
although the doctrine did not, he said, foreclose the claims by thrifts. To
argue that the government promised the thrifts a favorable accounting
device until the government chose to regulate in a different fashion repre-
sented "an absolutely classic description of an illusory promise."'1 88
In earlier decisions, Scalia argued for a clear-statement rule before
waiving sovereign power. Some of these cases concerned congressional
efforts to abrogate state sovereign power. Thus, Scalia joined the major-
ity in 1989 in holding that Congress may abrogate state immunity from
federal suits "only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the lan-
guage of the statute.' 89 However, in 1992 he wrote for the Court in
deciding that waivers of the sovereign immunity of the United States, "to
be effective, must be 'unequivocally expressed."' 190 He agreed that the
consent of the federal government to be sued "must be 'construed strictly
183. See infra notes 167-73 and accompanying text.
184. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. at 888.
185. See id. at 890.
186. "No provision of this section shall affect the authority of [FSLIC] to authorize
insured institutions to utilize subordinated debt and goodwill in meeting reserve and other
regulatory requirements." Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, 101 Pub. L. No.
100-86, Stat. 552, § 415(d) (1987).
187. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. at 918.
188. Id. at 921.
189. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989) (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
190. United States v. Nordic Village Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33 (1992) (citing Irwin v. Depart-
ment of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 445
U.S. 535, 538 (1980) and United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969)).
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in favor of the sovereign. '" '191 One analysis charges that Scalia, in Win-
star, "reinvents" the unmistakability doctrine.' 92 In 1999, Scalia joined a
dissenting opinion written by Kennedy, who said that waivers of sover-
eign immunity for the federal government "must be expressed in une-
quivocal statutory text and cannot be implied."'1 93 These rules of
construction, Kennedy added, "reserve authority over the public fisc to
the branch of Government with which the Constitution has placed it.' 194
Rehnquist's dissent in Winstar rebuked the Court for "drastically
reduc[ing] the scope of the unmistakability doctrine, shrouding the resi-
due with clouds of uncertainty, and [limiting] the sovereign acts doctrine
so that it will have virtually no future application."' 95 According to his
reading of previous cases, a waiver of sovereign authority "will not be
implied, but instead must be surrendered in unmistakable terms." 96
Thus for Rehnquist, the question under the unmistakability doctrine
should be: "Did the contract surrender the authority to enact or amend
regulatory measures as to the contracting party? If the sovereign did sur-
render its power unequivocally, and the sovereign breached that agree-
ment to surrender, then and only then would the issue of remedy for that
breach arise."'1 97
Rehnquist referred to the following language in the opinion by Souter:
"[n]othing in the documentation or the circumstances of these transac-
tions purported to bar the Government from changing the way in which it
regulated the thrift industry."' 198 However, any such change, Rehnquist
noted, would require courts to decide in subsequent proceedings whether
the damages to be recovered "would be akin to a rebate of a tax, and
therefore the 'equivalent of' an injunction.' 99 That type of analysis, he
said,
tosses to the winds any idea of the unmistakability doctrine as a ca-
non of construction; if a canon of construction cannot come into play
until the contract has first been interpreted as to liability by an ap-
pellate court, and remanded for computation of damages, it is no
canon of construction at all.2°°
The dissent also criticized Souter for placing Congress in the role of
contractor rather than as legislature, eliminating the sovereign rights as-
sociated with legislative action. Earlier cases emphasized both roles of
government: contractor and sovereign. In 1865 the Court of Claims
stated: "The United States as a contractor are not responsible for the
191. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. at 34 (quoting McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27
(1951)).
192. See Schwartz, supra note 179, at 538
193. West v. Gibson, 119 S. Ct. 1906, 1913 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
194. Id.
195. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. at 924.
196. Id. at 926.
197. Id. at 929 (emphasis in original).
198. Id. (quoting Justice Souter at 868).
199. Id. at 930.
200. Id. at 930-31.
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United States as a lawgiver."' 201 The Court of Claims added that it was a
fallacy to suppose that "general enactments of Congress are to be con-
strued as evasions of [a] particular contract. This is a grave error. '20 2
Rehnquist objected to Souter's analysis of the "public and general" na-
ture of a public law because Souter examined the government's motive
for passing the legislation.20 3 Under this test, courts would have to differ-
entiate between regulatory legislation that is free and not free of govern-
mental "self-interest. ' '204 Courts would have to decide: "When it enacted
FIRREA was the Government interested in saving its own money, or was
it interested in preserving the savings of those who had money invested in
the failing thrifts?"20 5 To Rehnquist, the broad scope of FIRREA enti-
tled it to be accepted as a "public and general" act.20 6
Toward the end of his dissent, Rehnquist focused on the budgetary im-
pact of the Court's decision. The purpose and value of sovereign author-
ity does not arise "from any ancient privileges of the sovereign, but from
the necessity of protecting the federal fisc-and the taxpayers who foot
the bills-from possible improvidence on the part of the countless Gov-
ernment officials who must be authorized to enter into contracts for the
Government. '20 7
3. Computing the Cost
With the case returned to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, the ques-
tion was narrowed to the determination of damages. Chief Judge Loren
A. Smith said in an interview in 1998 that it was not his job to protect the
public treasury: "It's not the duty of the judiciary to guard the fisc. A
judge's duty is to apply the law."'208 In this case, however, "the law" was
anything but clear. The courts were ploughing new ground.
The claims court first disposed of several procedural issues.209 In 1998,
the Federal Circuit barred one claim on the basis of the statute of limita-
201. Id. at 931 (quoting Deming v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 190, 191 (1865)).
202. Deming, 1 Ct. Cl. at 191.
203. See Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. at 931-32.
204. See id. at 932.
205. Id. at 933.
206. See id. at 933-34.
207. Id. at 937.
208. Stephen Labaton, The Debacle That Buried Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22,
1998, at 12BU.
209. See Plaintiffs in Winstar-Related Cases v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 174 (1997)
(holding that FIRREA was insufficient to trigger the six-year statute of limitations; the
time did not begin to run until the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) actually adopted
regulations to prevent the thrifts from counting good will toward their core capital require-
ments); Statesman Say. Holding Corp. v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 391 (1997) (holding
that a protective order preventing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
from gaining access to or releasing any FDIC documents to which private parties repre-
sented by the failed thrift would not have access was unwarranted); Glendale Fed. Bank,
FSB v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 422 (1997) (explaining motions on the introduction of
depositions of experts).
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tions,210 and later dismissed another claim as being time-barred.211 Also
in 1998, the claims court held that shareholders of an S&L institution
were entitled to seek direct recovery of restitution damages. 212 Decisions
were handed down in other circuits. 213
In 1998, the Justice Department reached a settlement with four thrifts
(including Winstar and Statesman Group of Iowa) for a total of $133 mil-
lion.214 The next year the U.S. Court of Federal Claims ordered the
United States to pay $908.9 million to a California thrift.215 The esti-
mated cost of another 125 pending suits is about $30 billion.216 Other
Winstar-type cases are in court, with claims against the Federal Govern-
ment coming from nuclear plants, utilities, low-income housing, and con-
tractors for commercial satellites.217
C. COAL INDUSTRY RETIREE BENEFITS
In a case that illustrates how statutory construction can shade into con-
stitutional analysis, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that a federal
statute, as applied to Eastern Enterprises, effected an unconstitutional
taking.218 Although the fiscal implications of this decision may be far-
reaching, there was little accord among the Justices. Justice O'Connor
announced the judgment of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia and Thomas. Justice Kennedy concurred in the judg-
ment and dissented in part. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion,
joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Breyer filed a dissenting
opinion, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg.
The statute at issue was the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act
of 1992,219 which it established a mechanism for funding health care ben-
efits for retirees from the coal industry and their dependents. A federal
district court upheld the constitutionality of the legislation, as did the
First Circuit.220 The appellate court said that the statute was "entitled to
the most deferential level of judicial scrutiny," and that as long as legisla-
tion is supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational
210. See Ariadne Fin. Servs. Pty. Ltd. v. United States, 133 F.3d 874 (Fed. Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 67 (1998).
211. See Shane v. United States, 161 F.3d 723 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
212. See Statesman Sav. Holding Corp. v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 1 (1998).
213. See Sharpe v. FDIC, 126 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 1997); Far W. Fed. Bank v. Office of
Thrift Supervision-Director, 119 F.3d 1358 (9th Cir. 1997).
214. See Michael Grunwald, Lawsuit Surge May Cost U.S. Billions, WASH. POST, Aug.
10, 1998, at A01, available in 1998 WL 16549133.
215. See Glendale Fed. Bank, FSB v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 390, 409 (1999); see also
California Fed. Bank v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 445 (1999).
216. See Richard B. Schmitt, Judge Orders U.S. to Pay $908.9 Million to California
Thrift Glendale Federal, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 1999, at A4, available in 1999 WL-WSJ
5447939.
217. See Grunwald, supra note 213.
218. See Eastern Enter. v. Apfel, 118 S.Ct. 2131 (1998).
219. 106 Stat. 3036, sec. 19141 (1992), 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-9722 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
220. See Eastern Enter. v. Chater, 110 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 1997); Eastern Enter. v.
Shalala, 942 F.Supp. 684 (D. Mass. 1996).
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means, judgments about the wisdom of legislation "remain within the ex-
clusive province of the legislative and executive branches. '221 Five other
appellate courts also upheld the statute against constitutional
challenges.222
The Supreme Court reversed, conceding that inquiries into unconstitu-
tional takings do not lend themselves to "any set formula" and are in fact
"essentially ad hoc. ' 223 In her plurality opinion, O'Connor stated that
past holdings "have left open the possibility that legislation might be un-
constitutional if it imposes severe retroactive liability on a limited class of
parties that could not have anticipated the liability, and the extent of that
liability is substantially disproportionate to the parties' experience. '224
Using that standard and three other factors, O'Connor concluded that the
statute violated the Takings Clause.225
Kennedy concurred in the judgment but regarded the plurality's Tak-
ings Clause analysis as "incorrect" and "unnecessary for decision of the
case," preferring to rest his concurrence on due process principles. 226 He
said the plurality's decision "would throw one of the most difficult and
litigated areas of the law into confusion, subjecting States and municipali-
ties to the potential of new and unforeseen claims in vast amounts. '227
The dissent by Stevens, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, ac-
cused the plurality and Kennedy of "substitut[ing] their judgment about
what is fair for the better informed judgment of the Members of the Coal
Commission and Congress. '228 Breyer's dissent, joined by Stevens, Sou-
ter, and Ginsburg, agreed with Kennedy that the Takings Clause "does
not apply. '229 Like Kennedy, Breyer would have decided the case on the
Due Process Clause.230 Unlike Kennedy, Breyer concluded that "it is not
fundamentally unfair for Congress to impose upon Eastern liability for
the future health care costs of miners whom it long ago employed-
rather than imposing that liability, for example, upon the present indus-
try, coal consumers, or taxpayers. '231
It is certainly dubious for the Court to require additional spending by
Congress when the Justices can manage only a bare majority. Eyebrows
rise even higher when five Justices open the door to greater federal
spending but rely on different legal or constitutional principles. If the
221. Chater, 110 F.3d at 155-56.
222. See Holland v. Keenan Trucking Co., 102 F.3d 736, 739-42 (4th Cir. 1996); Lindsey
Coal Mining Co. v. Chater, 90 F.3d 688, 693-95 (3d Cir. 1996); In re Blue Diamond Coal
Co., 79 F.3d 516, 521-26 (6th Cir. 1996); Davon, Inc. v. Shalala, 75 F.3d 1114, 1121-30 (7th
Cir. 1996); In re Chateaugay Corp., 53 F.3d 478, 486-96 (2d Cir. 1995).
223. Apfel, 118 S.Ct. at 2146.
224. Id. at 2149.
225. See id. at 2153.
226. See id. at 2154.
227. Id. at 2155.
228. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. at 2161.
229. See id.
230. See id. at 2163.
231. Id. at 2167.
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Court can do nothing better than announce "We think Congress is wrong
but can't agree on why," it is time to defer to the legislative judgment.
V. QUESTIONING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Congressional statutes and legislative history may seem tainted by con-
tributions made by congressional staff, interest groups, and lobbyists. In
a 1989 concurrence, Justice Scalia objected to reliance on a House com-
mittee report that cited several district court decisions. He said that
the references to the cases were inserted at best by a committee staff
member on his or her own initiative, and at worst by a committee
staff member at the suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist; and that the pur-
pose of [the] references was not ... to inform Members of Congress
but rather to influence judicial construction. 232
Elsewhere he noted that "[o]ne of the routine tasks of the Washington
lawyer-lobbyist is to draft language that sympathetic legislators can recite
in a prewritten 'floor debate'-or, even better, insert into a committee
report. "233
On these points Scalia is no doubt correct. Was a key amendment
drafted by a law firm? Quite possibly. Did an interest group write por-
tions of a committee report? It wouldn't be the first time. Are those
parts of the legislative history and eventual statutory text thereby ren-
dered illegitimate and contaminated? Why? If a private lawyer drafts a
bill that attracts a majority in each chamber and secures the President's
signature, it is still law. The bill's parentage might be interesting, but that
history is legally unimportant.
Speculation about who drafted committee report language raises a dif-
ferent issue, but there is probably no reason to give less deference to
report language simply because it comes from a lawyer-lobbyist. It may
seem nefarious, but suppose the committee staffer found the language
perfectly accurate in communicating the intent of Congress. If we ac-
knowledge, which we must, that interest groups not only push for legisla-
tion but help draft it, why is it impermissible for them to offer suggested
report language or floor statements?
What of the other branches? Surely interest groups and lobbyists have
a hand in writing departmental regulations, executive orders, and presi-
dential proclamations. Are those products similarly discredited? Not at
all. They have full legal force. As for the courts, it is not unusual to see a
marked similarity between paragraphs in a judicial ruling and what ap-
peared earlier in a brief filed by one of the interested parties. Such paral-
lels do not invalidate the decision. Courts recall well-drafted language,
agree with it, and see no need to reinvent what was said well the first
time.
232. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989).
233. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 34 (1997).
[Vol. 53
2000] KEEPING A RESPECTFUL EYE ON CONGRESS 77
During his career as a professor of law, Judge Frank H. Easterbrook
posed these questions for those interested in legislative history: "Who
lobbied for the legislation? What deals were struck in the cloakrooms?
Who demanded what and who gave up what? Knowing the contending
parties conveys information. '234 However, in determining what is law,
those questions are irrelevant. What counts is what made it into law, not
how it got there or who influenced it. One could just as easily ask about a
ruling of the Supreme Court: "Which interest groups lobbied for the deci-
sion? What deals were struck in the conference room? Who demanded
what and who gave up what?" Such questions do not change the holding.
The congressional process is not unique because of staff contributions
or interest-group participation, which are common to all three branches.
To those who question the value of congressional reports because of staff
participation, Congressman Robert Kastenmeier and Michael Remington
asked: "Should elected representatives give less respect to judicial opin-
ions written in large part by law clerks?" 235 Judge Patricia M. Wald made
a similar point during a congressional hearing in 1990:
Just as you do not reject adherence to our opinions because they may
rely on previous cases with which our law clerks are intimately famil-
iar, but which we may not have always read in detail, we should not
reject the written evidence which you leave us, even if your staff has
read every word, while you are only generally familiar with its
broader outlines.236
The unique quality about the congressional process is not its reliance
on staff but rather its relative openness. The transparency of congres-
sional proceedings is not matched by the executive and judicial branches.
We are seldom aware of who drafts executive orders and presidential
proclamations. At some point they just emerge and are accepted as legit-
imate documents. If it could be shown that the President never drafted a
single word of an executive order and had only a vague knowledge of
what was in it (not difficult to demonstrate), and that an interest group
was responsible for the initial and even final draft, its authenticity and
binding nature on the executive branch-and often on the private sec-
tor-would not be questioned. The legislative process is entitled to the
same presumption.
Statutes and legislative history are often belittled because of vague and
ambiguous provisions. Of course such criticism can be directed toward
many, if not most, statutes (and many, if not most, judicial rulings). The
human language is one source of this imprecision. In an essay for The
234. Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 17 (1984).
235. Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, A Judicious Legislator's Lexicon
to the Federal Judiciary, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY
79 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988).
236. Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History: Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice, the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1990) [hereinafter Statutory
Interpretation].
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Federalist, James Madison stopped to pause at the inherent limitations of
language. Words are used to express ideas,
but no language is so copious as to supply words and phrases for
every complex idea, or so correct as not to include many equivocally
denoting different ideas. . . . When the Almighty himself conde-
scends to address mankind in their own language, his meaning, lumi-
nous as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful by the cloudy
medium through which it is communicated. 237
To the shortcomings of language add the difficulty of getting legislation
through two chambers, battered at every stage by interest groups, con-
stantly reshaped by partisan calculations, and forced to accommodate
White House demands because of the ever-present threat of a Presiden-
tial veto. At the end of that process, of course, one can find tortured text
and inconsistent legislative history. But vagueness is not unique to large,
complex legislative bodies. Multi-membered appellate courts face similar
problems, even without having to contend so directly with well-financed
outside parties and executive lobbying. If a majority of nine Justices can-
not craft a clear opinion, why expect more from 535 Members of Con-
gress operating in a political cauldron? Judge Abner J. Mikva advised
that "[i]t is unseemly for judges, even Supreme Court Justices, to criticize
Congress for not speaking with clearer tongues: ask lawyers or law stu-
dents who try to parse out some of our opinions what they think about
judicial clarity. '238
There is good reason to treat cautiously the material that falls under
the broad category "legislative history." Judge James L. Buckley flagged
the principal areas of concern. Having served in the U.S. Senate, he was
well positioned to "have little confidence in the reliability or relevance of
much of the materials that is routinely consulted by courts. '239 More-
over, he questioned the ability of judges "to distinguish between the stat-
utory wheat and the useless or downright misleading political chaff that is
generated in the course of committee hearings and floor discussion. '240
No matter how many Members of Congress say it is their intent to legis-
late a right, if the right is not in the statute there is no obligation on the
part of courts to put it there. The proper procedure at that point is to
return the matter to Congress for legislative (i.e., statutory) action. Buck-
ley also expressed concern about allowing statements made during com-
mittee hearings or floor debate to determine what is lawful:
... this is a country that is increasingly ruled in small detail by the
laws that are produced by Congress. They have to be interpreted by
human beings across the country, by small town lawyers who do not
have access to bound volumes of the Congressional Record, let alone
of the committee hearings and so forth. They ought to be able to
237. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 270 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961).
238. Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 28 S. TEX. L. REV. 181, 187 (1986).
239. Statutory Interpretation, supra note 235, at 21.
240. Id.
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rely on the statutory language as illuminated by carefully written
committee reports to guide their clients.24 1
Whatever skepticism judges may want to direct toward legislative his-
tory, federal officials will continue to take seriously what they read in
committee reports, floor debates, and even correspondence they receive
from committee chairmen with jurisdiction over their agency.2 42 Agen-
cies understand the cost of poisoning their relations with authorization
and appropriations committees. As Justice Scalia has noted, regardless of
what courts do, administrative agencies "which end up having the first cut
at 90 percent of federal law anyway ... will assuredly use it [committee
report]." 2 43 Private counsel who prepare for litigation will carefully sift
through legislative history for leads. Kenneth S. Geller, a former deputy
solicitor general, remarked that he wasn't aware "of any brief that our
firm has filed that failed to rely on legislative history. First, Justice Scalia
is the minority up there, and second, it can't hurt to use legislative history
if it helps your case."'244
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Professor William Eskridge suggested that when federal judges per-
form statutory construction they should do more than consider text and
historical context, "but also their subsequent history, related legal devel-
opments, and current societal context, '245 a process he labels "dynamic"
statutory interpretation.246 This method of interpretation invites judges
to exercise considerable ingenuity in deciding what is best for society.
Judges would play the role of "diplomats, whose ordering authority is
severely limited but who must often update their orders to meet changing
circumstances. '2 47 Such an approach dispenses with what Eskridge calls
a static view of statutory interpretation that regards lawmaking by judges
as "beyond the authority given them in the Constitution, for it trenches
upon the lawmaking power given to Congress. '2 48
Later, in a book-length treatment, Professor Eskridge elaborated on
these points. Citing language from the author of a law review article, he
urged judges to consider "not only what the statute means abstractly, or
even on the basis of legislative history, but also what it ought to mean in
241. Id. at 66. On the general importance of committee report language over other
parts of the legislative history, see George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other
"Benign Fictions": The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other
Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39.
242. See Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICrS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT 103-06 (4th ed. 1997).
243. Kastenmeier & Remington, supra note 234, at 175.
244. Joan Biskupic, Scalia Sees No Justice in Trying to Judge Intent of Congress on a
Law, WASH. POST, May 11, 1993, at A4, available in 1993 WL 2192386.
245. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479, 1479, 1482 (1987).
246. See id. at 1482.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1498.
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terms of the needs and goals of our present day society. '249 Using this
approach, statutory interpretation by judges results in a statute that "is
not necessarily the one which the original legislature would have en-
dorsed. '250 To the same effect, he calls attention to Aristotle's advice
that those who must interpret general statutes to apply to unanticipated
cases should "correct the omission-to say what the legislator would have
said had he been present, and would have put into law if he had
known. " 251
"Dynamic" interpretation can mean different things. I agree that
courts should not limit their attention to statutory text, legislative con-
text, and canons of construction. But to allow judges to say what the law
"ought to mean" or what a legislator "would have said" is an exercise in
judicial arrogation. It is this type of conduct that undermines judicial
credibility, judicial legitimacy and, eventually, judicial independence.
"We can legislate better than Congress" is not a wise strategy for the
courts. A dynamic quality is needed, but it is one that would have judges
look more broadly at their place in a system of separation of powers, to
think institutionally as well as procedurally, and to weigh their canons of
interpretation against the constitutional responsibilities of Congress. Jus-
tice Scalia has noted that it is "simply not compatible with democratic
theory that laws mean whatever they ought to mean, and that unelected
judges decide what that is." '25 2
Judge Harold Leventhal once remarked that citing legislative history is
similar to "looking over a crowd and picking out your friends. '253 No
doubt the courts have a wealth of resources when making their selections.
In performing that operation, judges should not limit statutory interpreta-
tion to the available canons of construction, for too often they are impre-
cise, inward looking, and fail to comprehend the judiciary's place in a
democratic society. Treating your friends should include being aware of
Congress as a coordinate and coequal branch in many matters and the
superior branch when it comes to lawmaking and the purse. Picking out
Congress as a friend is a good way to avoid making Congress an enemy.
249. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 50 (1994)
(quoting Arthur W. Phelps, Factors Influencing Judges in Interpreting Statutes, 3 VAND. L.
REV. 456, 469 (1950)).
250. ESKRIDGE, supra note 249, at 5.
251. Id. at 50 (quoting ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Bk. 5, ch. 10 (W.D.
Ross trans., revised by J.O. Urmson, rev. Oxford ed. 1984)).
252. SCALIA, supra note 233, at 22.
253. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983).
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